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Adam v. State, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 54 (Sept. 22, 2011)1 
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE- Procuring Agent Defense 
 
Summary 
 
 An appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury verdict, for trafficking in a 
controlled substance.   
 
Disposition/ Outcome 
 
 The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the conviction because  the procuring agent 
defense is inapplicable to trafficking charges.  Furthermore, the Court overruled its prior cases to 
the extent that they have allowed a defendant to use the procuring agent defense against a charge 
of trafficking in a controlled substance based on a possession theory.  
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
A confidential informant told  Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Detective Mike Wilson that 
Ramon Dinkha Adam (“Adam”) had the ability to procure drugs.  Detective Wilson, working 
undercover, sought out a friendship with Adam. At some point during their friendship, Detective 
Wilson claimed Adam said he had “connects” to purchase illegal drugs.  Detective Wilson 
subsequently asked Adam to procure methamphetamine. Adam helped Detective Wilson 
purchase 12.64 grams, or $500 worth of methamphetamine. Consequently, the State of Nevada 
charged Adam with trafficking in a controlled substance pursuant to NRS 453.3385.    
 
During his jury trial, Adam requested permission to give the jury an instruction entailing 
the procuring agent defense. The district court denied his request, reasoning that it was not 
supported by the evidence, as Adam initiated the sale when he said he had “connects” to 
purchase drugs. The court also concluded that Adam’s request was untimely.  The jury returned a 
guilty verdict for Adam, and he was sentenced to forty-eight months in prison. This appeal 
followed.       
 
Discussion 
 
   The Supreme Court began its analysis by evaluating its prior decisions that allowed the 
procuring agent defense for charges of trafficking based on possession, as opposed to trafficking 
based on selling, manufacturing, delivering, or bringing a controlled substance into the state. The 
procuring agent defense originally prevented a defendant from being convicted of selling 
controlled substances if the jury found that the defendant was only acting on behalf of a buyer 
when procuring drugs.  This initial analysis was made more complex once Nevada adopted drug 
trafficking statutes in 1983.  Early decisions interpreting the trafficking statutes allowed this 
defense in cases of trafficking based on possession, if “the facts reveal a sale was 
contemplated.”2  
                                                            
1 By Matthew Vantusko  
2 Love v. State, 111 Nev. 545, 548-49, 893 P.2d 376, 387 (1995); See Hillis v. State, 103 Nev. 531, 535, 746 P.2d 
1092, 1095 (1987).   
 
The Court requires compelling reasons to not follow stare decisis.  In the instant case, the 
Court decided not to abide by its prior precedents because the Uniform Controlled Substances 
Act, which Nevada drug trafficking law is based on, requires that all actors in the illicit drug deal  
equally culpable when a trafficking quantity of a controlled substance is involved. Furthermore, 
the purpose of trafficking laws is not to distinguish between the sellers and the buyers of 
controlled substances if the amount is greater than the proscribed trafficking quantity. 
Consequently, it would be inappropriate to allow the normal leniency of the procuring agent 
defense because the agent is guilty of the same crime as the principal.        
 
Additionally, the Court reasoned that the procuring agent defense functions to defend 
against sale convictions by not allowing the required element of a sale to be proven.  Such a 
defense would not work against crimes such as simple possession or trafficking where a sale is 
not a required element. Accordingly, the Court concluded that allowing the procuring agent 
defense in the trafficking context not only defeats the purpose of trafficking laws, but also is 
structurally inadequate as it does not prohibit a showing of a required element of the crime of 
trafficking.  For these reasons, the Court affirmed the district court.  In addition, the Court 
explicitly overruled its prior cases to the extent they have allowed a defendant to use the 
procuring agent defense to defend against a charge of trafficking in a controlled substance based 
on a possession theory.    
 
Conclusion 
 
  The procuring agent defense is inapplicable to trafficking charges, regardless of the 
theory under which the defendant is charged. The Court further overruled prior cases to the 
extent they have allowed a defendant to use the procuring agent defense to defend against a 
charge of trafficking in a controlled substance based on a possession theory. Thus, the Court held 
that the district court’s refusal to allow a procuring agent jury instruction was not in error, 
affirming Adam’s conviction.   
 
       
  
